Summary of First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Lane, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 96 by Phippen, Patrick
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
12-24-2014
Summary of First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Lane, 130
Nev. Adv. Op. 96
Patrick Phippen
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Contracts Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Phippen, Patrick, "Summary of First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Lane, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 96" (2014). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries.
Paper 838.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/838
First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Lane, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 96 (Dec. 24, 2014)1 
 




 The Court determined that (1) the limitation in the second sentence of NRS 40.451 
simply means a lender cannot recover in deficiency judgment actions for future advances secured 
but not paid at the time of default and (2) NRS 40.451 by itself does not contemplate successors 




Gordon and Carol Lane (“Lane”) took out a $3 million loan secured by a piece of 
commercial real estate that was guaranteed by John C. Serpa (“Serpa”).  After the Lanes 
defaulted, Serpa failed to guarantee.  Before the original lender could foreclose, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) was appointed receiver and assigned the loan to First 
Financial Bank, N.A. (“FFB”) in exchange for $2,256,879.90 (75% of the total amount then 
due).  FFB foreclosed and brought a deficiency judgment and breach of guaranty action against 
the Lanes and Serpa.  The district court entered judgment in favor of the Lanes and Serpa 
because the fair market value (“FMV”) of the property ($2.3 million) exceeded the consideration 




 NRS 40.451 lists the categories of debt a creditor may seek in a deficiency judgment:  
principal balance, accrued interest, costs of sale, advances with respect to the property (i.e., 
expenses incurred by the lender to protect its security), and other amounts secured by the 
mortgage (i.e., future advances).2  NRS 40.451 also states that “[s]uch amount constituting a lien 
is limited to the amount of the consideration paid by the lienholder.”3 
 
Limitation in second sentence of NRS 40.451 
  
 The opening phrase “[s]uch amount” of the second sentence of NRS 40.451 suggests that 
it applies only to the last category of debt listed in the first sentence, i.e, to future advances.4  The 
Court explained that both the original version of the law and its current form have the effect of 
“ensuring that a lender could not recover in deficiency judgment for future advances”.    
 Legislative history supports this interpretation, as does the Nevada federal district court.5  
The limitation was originally described as capping deficiency judgments to the amount actually 
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due and owing.6  When the law was updated, proponents of the bill explained that courts can 
award deficiency judgments after foreclosure if “the sale is less than the amount that the 




 The Lanes and Serpa argued that NRS 40.459(1)(c) may limit deficiency action 
judgments in favor of successors-in-interest to the consideration paid by a third-party purchaser 
for assignment of secured debt.8  However, successors-in-interest are not addressed at all in NRS 
40.451 either directly or indirectly.9  Moreover, it is “well established” that an assignee “stands 
in the shoes” of the assignor and succeeds to all legal rights the assignor had before the 
assignment.10  The Court explained that the passage of NRS 459(1)(c) is evidence that NRS 
40.451’s limitation “does not contemplate consideration exchanged between an assignor and an 
assignee” because otherwise NRS 459(1)(c) would be moot.11  Furthermore, there is no mention 




 NRS 40.451 does not set an assignor-assignee, consideration-based limit on FFB’s 
recovery against the Lanes and Serpa.  Since FFB’s recovery is not limited to the amount it paid 
when acquiring the loan and guarantees, the Court reversed the ruling of the district court and 
ordered the district court to consider how much, if any, deficiency was owed following the 
foreclosure sale.   
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